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Economic Implications of State-Wide Covid-19
Response Aggressiveness
Bryan Foltice
Michael Parker

ABSTRACT
This paper aims to evaluate how the aggressiveness of each state’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic
affected their respective economies from Q2, 2020 through Q2, 2021. In our study, we utilize the scale
developed by McCann (2021, April 6), which ranks the least aggressive state response to the most aggressive
state response at three different points of the pandemic. Through this methodology, we test the impact of
the aggressiveness of each state governments’ response with the resulting economic impact within that state.
Namely, we examine how this level of response affected each state’s unemployment rate, gross domestic
product growth, and taxable sales growth of 27 various industries. In our analysis, we find that there was
a significantly negative impact between each states response aggression and unemployment rates, GDP
growth, and taxable sales for a sizable percentage of the analyzed industries. These results appear to remain
consistent when we both analyze the instant quarterly impact of the restrictions imposed on a state, and
when we factor in a quarter lag for each state’s response.

Introduction

C

OVID-19 has had an extraordinary impact
across regional, governmental, social, and
economic sectors. Businesses and government
policymakers are both having to respond to
the COVID-19 crisis in the moment, and with
little precedence as to how they should respond.
COVID-19 has shown the importance of
expanding crisis literature in order to identify and
improve how we address the growing complexity
of modern and future crises. With new infections,
deaths, and shutdowns happening in real time, the
COVID-19 crisis has differentiated itself as being
a complicated and ongoing crisis on a worldwide
scale. Responses to the crisis have been vastly
different, from very strict and widespread “shut
down” measures, to more open “business-as-usual”
approaches. To date, there is no clear precedent on
how to respond to such a crisis.
In this paper, we aim to better understand how
economies are affected by the severity of the
elected officials COVID responses. In the United
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States, the onus of response to the Covid-19
pandemic has been largely shouldered by state and
local officials. Thus, in our sample, we have 50
unique responses to this pandemic each quarter.
In this study, we utilize the scale developed
by McCann (2021, April 6), which ranks the
least aggressive state response (1) to the most
aggressive state response (50). These rankings
are determined by 51 various factors, such as:
Mandatory business closures, mandated masking,
large gathering restrictions, etc. (McCann, 2021,
April 6). Through this methodology, we test the
impact of the strength of each state governments’
response (least versus most aggressive) with the
resulting economic impact within that respective
state. In our analysis, we examine how this level
of response affected each states unemployment
rate, gross domestic product growth, and taxable
sales of 27 various industries. The purpose of our
study is to gain a better understanding about the
relationship between governmental response and
economic impact as well as which industries were
the least and most impacted by the state’s response
aggression rating.

Economic Implications of State-Wide Covid-19 Response Aggressiveness

7

In our analysis, we find that the aggression
rating significantly increases the unemployment
rate changes during the analyzed periods. We
also see that the aggression rating significantly
decreases year-over-year GDP growth as well as
taxable sales for a sizable percentage of the 27
analyzed industries. These results appear to remain
consistent when we both analyze the instant
quarterly impact of the restrictions imposed on a
state, and when we factor in a quarter lag for each
state’s response. Finally, our analysis shows that
the higher percent of white population in each
state helped to mitigate the effects of the crisis in
most of the analyzed periods for unemployment
rates, GDP growth and taxable sales.

LITERATURE REVIEW

modern crisis, like COVID-19, to fit under the
category, called a transboundary crisis. Boin
(2009) defined a transboundary crisis as one that
jumps functional (institutional, governmental, etc.)
and transcends time (start-stop) boundaries. While
the consensus and conflict crisis models have
certain elements of the transboundary crisis, they
are not nearly to scale of the COVID-19 crisis.
Moreover, the transboundary crisis is longer and
causes more damage than the contemporary crisis
(Boin, 2009). COVID-19 has differentiated itself
because it has been ongoing for over a year and
has caused sharp and sustained drops in GDP and
employment.

Resilience and government policy

Merriam Webster’s dictionary
(2016) defines resilience as “the
Crises
ability of something to recover
“..the
aggression
rating
Crises are described as unknown,
from or adjust to misfortune or
significantly increases the
sudden events that have
change.” This standard definition
immediate but lasting effects.
unemployment rate changes
is enough to characterize many
Bean (2001) identified crises as
during the analyzed periods. We
previous social and environmental
either of two types: consensus or
also see that the aggression rating
disasters because of their limited
conflict. A conflict crisis is one
significantly decreases year-overscope. With the advent of a more
that does not affect everyone
complex economic disruption
year GDP growth as well as taxable
equally; usually a conflict crisis
due to an international disease
sales for a sizable percentage of
takes the form of a riot or other
outbreak, this definition is not
the 27 analyzed industries.”
civil disturbance. Matheson &
comprehensive enough. We
Baade (2004) found that the
now have to understand this
Rodney King riots had a much
phenomena as it applies to more
greater effect on Los Angeles city than the whole
people and geographical areas. Ringwood et al.
of LA County. On the other hand, a consensus
(2019) found that when quantifying resilience
crisis is one that affects everyone equally, much
of a certain region, there are certain geographic
like that of a hurricane or other natural disaster.
differences that need to be accounted for based
Smith and McCarty (1996) found that Hurricane
on the industries on which that particular region
Andrew affected all parts of the Miami population
is dependent on. Understanding resilience as
equally. Some crises, like that of Katrina, combine
a function of a larger region and not just one
elements of both consensus and conflict due to
local area is important when tracking recovery
the size and severity it has on a single population
at a macroeconomic level. Regional economic
(Baade et al., 2007). Local disease outbreaks fit
resilience is defined as the capacity of a regional
under this definition (Garrett, 2007, November),
or local economy to withstand, recover from and
but not those disease outbreaks which apply to
reorganize in the face of market, competitive,
a national or global scale. These types of crises,
and environmental shocks to its developmental
however, are not to scale and do not encapsulate
growth path (Boschma 2015; Bristow & Healy,
the size and complexity of the modern crisis.
2014; Di Pietro et al., 2021; Paulson Gjerde
Scholars have expanded their perception of the
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et al.; 2019; Martin & Sunley; 2015; Zhang
et al., 2021) Working with this definition, it is
important to see economic resilience as a long
term development. Regional resilience consists of
4 phases: Resistance, recovery, reorientation and
renewal (Di Pietro et al, 2020; Paulson Gjerde et
al., 2019; Martin, 2012; Martin & Sunley; 2015).
How each state utilizes policy beforehand can
offset the timing of a recession; how they respond
can accelerate the process towards reorientation
and renewal. Resilience is a measurement of
how quickly and efficiently a region can progress
through these phases. Scholars also identify the
delays in unemployment growth and GDP drops
as economic hysteresis (Sutherland & Hoeler,
2013). Factors that are most inversely correlated
to economic hysteresis are worth
further investigation, as these promote
economic resilience.
Which factors play the biggest role in resilience
are contested among scholars, and many
studies have dichotomous conclusions. Martin
and Sunley (2015) identified four economic
subsystems that play a role in regional resiliency:
Industrial structure and business subsystem,
labor market subsystem, financial subsystem,
and the governance subsystem. Multiple studies
show that diversification is the most important
resilience factor because any given region will not
be dependent on the success of one or a couple
industries (Ringwood et al., 2019; Zenka et al.,
2019). Despite this, Giannakis and Bruggeman
(2017) found that specialized economies and
human capital (which was the most important
factor in this study) are both positively correlated
to regional resilience. Most pertinently, Zenka
et al. (2019) argued that government was not a
stabilizer in the economy. We contest all of these
points, postulating that government is perhaps
the most important factor when tracking regional
resilience and that it can have a positive (or
negative) effect on regional resilience. Ezcurra
and Rios (2019) reasoned that the quality of
government can affect the type, frequency and
intensity of economic shocks and that low quality
government will have a negative impact on
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any given region. Certain government policies
have even been shown to increase/decrease
macroeconomic stability to shocks and can
promote long term growth (Paulson Gjerde et al.,
2019; Sutherland & Hoeller, 2013).
Considering the vast array of differences of various
economies’ size, structure, etc., government is
the most uniform institution across geographical
regions, and therefore, can be a highly reliable
factor to scrutinize. Moreover, the COVID-19
crisis has prompted a government-led response
of non-pharmaceutical intervention, one that
is not economic in nature, but with severe
economic repercussions (Verschuur et al., 2021).
Nevertheless, focusing on each region’s variation
in economic structure is important as well when
measuring for resistance and recovery. Di Pietro
et al. (2021) classified and measured each region’s
baseline economic system based on factor intensity
(capital/labor intensive), openness (trade), and
specialization. Applying these measures to US
states can help better differentiate those economic
affects that are attributed to each economies’
uniqueness and those that were caused by
government policy. Thus, focusing on other
economic factors can help delineate effects caused
by different structures and decipher a cause
and effect relationship from each governments’
response.

Coronavirus Overview and Economic Recovery
With an extant amount of literature covering
crisis and government policy, we now turn
towards evaluating the COVID-19 crisis. In the
beginning of 2020, an unconfirmed virus broke
out of a lab in Wuhan, China, originally identified
as Pneumonia. As World Health Organization
and Chinese government officials focused their
efforts they came to identify an outbreak of a
novel Coronavirus, now known as COVID-19.
Due to the unknown nature of the virus and the
interconnectedness of international economies,
the COVID-19 virus spread rapidly. By February
3rd, 2020, the US had declared a public health
emergency due to the Coronavirus’ rapid spread.
Between the months of March and May, the
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US government mandated shutdowns, enforced
masking in public, and took other preventive
measures to stop the spread.
COVID-19 can be defined as a transboundary
crisis because its beginning and ending are unclear
and it has impacted virtually every industry,
region, etc. It is appropriate to still perceive this
crisis as happening in the moment because the
crisis-causing factor (COVID-19 virus) is still
causing new infections (as of the end of 2021,
when this analysis was conducted). While the
coronavirus has had a disproportionate impact on
different regions/cities, which are characteristics
of a conflict crisis, it is ultimately transboundary
in nature because of its ambiguous beginning and
unclear end, as well as its ability to spread rapidly.
Moreover, COVID-19 has had disproportionate
effects among different countries and demographic
areas, thus making the situation evermore
complex. Pelling et al. (2002) found that the
size and structure of economies are the largest
factor influencing different countries impacted
by disaster; larger more developed countries can
better manage disaster because they are able to
spread the impacts over space and time. Despite
these advantages, the US economies have still been
some of the most impacted by the COVID-19
pandemic. In this paper, we seek to build off this
previous research to better understand economic
outcomes based on level of evaluating three
main economic factors: taxable sales, GDP and
unemployment growth. We plan to examine these
factors to the level of each state’s response.
Scholars have found that measuring taxable sales
is a good indicator of industry performance in
different areas, as these are measured at county,
city and statewide levels and collected either
monthly, quarterly, and/or yearly (Baade et al.,
2007; Matheson & Bade, 2004). Taxable sales
are defined as the total sales of taxable goods
and services by a particular business for a given
period of time. Collecting data on taxable sales
from before and during the COVID-19 crisis
can be viewed as a measure of how well each
industry is currently performing in each state. The
unemployment rate is regularly used to track the
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health of the overall economy and is a byproduct
of taxable sales drops (Ezcurra & Rios, 2019;
Fratesi & Rodriguez-Pose, 2016; Giannakis &
Bruggeman, 2017; Ringwood et al., 2019; Zenka
et al., 2019). GDP provides a high level overview
of industry health; it measures all the transactions
and productivity within any given industry, not
just the sales from that industry. By examining
taxable sales data, unemployment, and GDP,
we believe we can paint a picture of how the
economies of each state performed in 2020 and
2021 (up to Q2) during the pandemic. Pairing
this with state response rankings, we can
better understand how policy has affected all
three measures.
For the first part of the analysis, we measure the
change of the unemployment rate, based on the
level of aggressiveness of response. In this section,
we believe that more aggressive restrictions will
lead to higher (positive) year-over-year changes
in unemployment over each of the four analyzed
periods. In the second section, we analyze yearover-year GDP growth, based on the level of
aggressiveness of response. We believe that more
restrictions will lead to lower GDP growth over
each of the four analyzed periods. Finally, we will
analyze overall taxable sales for 27 of the main
industry categories for each state and compare the
year-over-year changes to the aggression level of
state restrictions. Overall, we believe that more
aggressive states with restrictions will lead to
lower taxable sales, particularly in those industries
that are influenced by the restrictions, such as
service and travel industries.
For all three sections, we not only analyze
the instant quarterly economic impact of the
restrictions imposed on a state, but we also factor
in a quarter lag for each state’s response. During
crises, regions typically experience a secondary
shock after the initial event, which affects the
overall level of economic resilience in the region
(Zhang et al., 2021). By factoring in a lag, we
can account for those impacts immediately felt
from the economic shock, as well as those that
are delayed.
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METHODOLOGY
Design and Procedure
At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic,
McCann (2021, April 6) created a framework
to assess the nature of each state government’s
response, looking at 51 various metrics across three
main dimensions: “Prevention and Containment,”
“Risk Factors and Infrastructure,” and “Economic
Impact.” He then assigned a weighted average
to each dimension: 75% to Prevention and
Containment (such as travel and large gathering
restrictions), 20% to Risk Factors and Infrastructure
(for example, restrictions on drugs related to
Covid-19 treatment), and 5% to Economic Impact
(state who have enacted budget legislation in
response to Covid-19). McCann (2021, April 6)
utilized a 100-point scale to measure each state’s
response, 1 (100) being the least (most) aggressive
response. He then ranked each state from least (1) to
most (50) aggressive. These rankings were generated
and published three times: April 7, 2020 (beginning
of Q2), October 6, 2020 (beginning of Q4), and
January 26, 2021 (beginning of Q1) (McCann,
2021, April 6).
In this analysis, we gathered economic data by
state, based on overall taxable sales, taxable sales
by various industries (27), unemployment rate, and
GDP. All three measures of study, Unemployment
and GDP growth, and taxable sales are posted each
quarter, which will enable us to analyze quarterly
performance throughout our sample.
To more holistically understand the landscape of
each state, we included the following variables
into the regression analysis: Aggression rating,
percentage of working age population, population
with bachelor’s degrees or higher, Gini index,
population density, and percentage of white
population. We applied these variables to the change
in unemployment, GDP growth, and taxable sales
(all with both with no lag & one quarter lag). Below
is a brief description of each variable:
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1.	Aggression Rating: This variable ranks the
strictness of each state response to COVID,
including criteria like: mask mandates,
business closures, stay at home orders, etc.
Each state is ranked on a scale 1-50, 1 being
the least aggressive and 50 being the most
aggressive response (McCann, 2021, April 6)
2.	Working Age: This variable measures the
percent of working age population in each
state, which are those individuals age 25-60
(OECD, n.d.)
3.	Population with bachelors: This variable
measures the percent of population with a
bachelor’s or higher degree in each state.
(National Science Foundation, n.d.).
4.	Gini index: This variable measures the income
inequality by each state. (World Population
Review, n.d.).
5.	Population Density: This variable measures
the population concentration (person/sq. mile)
in each state (United States Census Bureau,
2021, April 26).
6.	White: This variable measures the percent
of the population that is white in each
state (United States Census Bureau, 2021,
August 12).

results
Our study commences in January, 2020, and runs
through June, 2021, using quarterly data from Q1,
2019 to Q2, 2021. This time period encapsulates key
economic factors before the COVID-19 economic
shock, during the shock, and the beginning of the
economic recovery thereafter. The data comes from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), where there
is a repository on quarterly economic data for each
industry in each state. Many economic repercussions
are felt after the initial shock, so this was factored in
by accounting for a one (1) quarter lag.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics – Base Variables

In terms of overall unemployment across all states,
as depicted in Table 1, the largest shock happened
during Quarter 2 of 2020, where the year-overyear unemployment rate increased by an average of
8.22%, ranging from 3.47% up to 19.20%. This
negative impact is supported by the YoY average
-9.21% change in GDP growth. Year-over-year

unemployment rates increased for all 50 states in
Quarters 3 & 4 of 2020, and remained positive,
on average, for Q1 2021. GDP growth followed
the same general trend: Average negative growth
in Quarters 3 (-2.95%) and 4 (-2.33%) for 2020,
with some subsequent stabilization and increases for
Quarters 1 (0.54%) and 2 (11.76%) in 2021.

Unemployment Changes
Table 2
Unemployment YoY Change (no lag)
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Table 3
Unemployment YoY Change (1 Quarter lag)

Next, we lag the economic (unemployment)
results by one quarter in order to investigate if the
restriction aggressiveness has any delayed impact.
For example, our Q2 2020 aggressiveness ranking
are analyzed against the unemployment impact of
the following quarter (Q3 2020). In Table 3, we

find that each state’s aggression rating maintains
its significance as a driver of higher unemployment.
For Q1 2021 with a quarter lag, the strength of the
results appear to dissipate as the economy worked
to reopen in Q2, 2021.

GDP Changes
Table 4
GDP YoY Change (no lag)

In this section, we run a similar OLS regression
analysis using the year-over-year changes in GDP
growth for each of the three analyzed quarters. In
Table 4, we see that, once again, that the aggression
rating has a statistically significant negative impact
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on year-over-year GDP change, for Q2 and Q4 of
2020. Here, we also can see evidence that those
states with higher percent white populations
exhibited significantly less negative GDP growth
during the Pandemic.
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Table 5
GDP YoY Change (1 Quarter lag)

Next, we again lag the economic (GDP growth)
results by one quarter in order to investigate if the
restriction aggressiveness has any delayed impact.
Here, we see a consistently negative impact of the
state’s aggression rating on year-over-year GDP
growth. White population percentage maintains a
significantly positive relationship on GDP growth,
after factoring a one quarter lag.

Taxable Sales Growth, by Industry
In the third section of the analysis, we analyze the
quarterly taxable sales year-over-year growth for
27 various industries, retrieved from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), n.d.). For the average year-overyear sales growth calculation, we take an equallyweighted average of the yearly change for all 50
States in each of the 27 industries each quarter.

Table 6
Descriptive Statistics (equally-weighted YoY Taxable Sales in %)
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In Table 6, total industry taxable sales revenue were
net negative YoY for both Q2 and Q3 of 2020
until Q42020, which reported a 2.3% positive
YoY differential. The hardest hit industries during
Q2 2020 were: 1. (3) Mining, quarrying, oil and
gas extraction, 22. (76) Arts and Entertainment,
and 3. (76) Accommodation and Food Service.
While the mining industry bounced back in Q4
2020, posting positive growth in Q4 2020 to Q2,
2021, Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation as well
as Accommodation and Food Services remained
negative until Q2, 2021. Industries with more
modest changes in taxable sales YoY signals
their resilience to changing circumstances as they

still have similar sales/revenues despite adverse
events. These include line codes: 10 (utilities), 45
(Information), 51 (Finance and Insurance), 56 (Real
Estate), 84 (Federal Civilian), and 85 (Military).
These industries can be described as having more
immediate economic resistance to change (McCann,
2021, April 6).
The next three tables run similar OLS regressions
to the previous two sections (unemployment and
GDP growth), and use taxable sales growth for each
industry as the dependent variable. To improve the
clarity and readability of the below tables, we only
post coefficients with a “p-value” less than 0.10.

Table 7
Taxable sales Q2, 2020 (no lag| 1 Quarter lag)
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From Table 7, we see that the aggression of each
state’s response had a significant immediate and
delayed impact on the taxable sales for many
industries in Q2 and Q3, 2020. Those industries
who showed immediate impact are the following
industry line codes: 25 (Non-durables), 76 (Arts

& Rec.), 79 (Accommodations), 83 (Government),
85 (Military), and 86 (State & Local). When we
evaluate the one quarter lag, we see that there was
also a significantly negative delayed impact on 10 of
the 27 analyzed industries of the state aggressiveness
response on taxable sales growth.

Table 8
Taxable sales Q4, 2020 (no lag| 1 Quarter lag)

In Table 8, we again detect a strong negative impact
between each state’s aggression response rating
and taxable sales changes for Q4 2020 (and Q1
2021 when factoring in a one quarter lag). Here,
12 industries out of 27 post a significant immediate
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impact between response aggression rating and
taxable sales declines. Nearly half of the industries
(13 out of 27) were significantly negatively affected
by the aggressiveness ranking when factoring a
quarter lag.
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Table 9
Taxable sales Q1 2021 (no lag| 1 Quarter lag)

In Table 9, we yet again see the negative impact
between each state’s response aggression and taxable
sales for immediately thereafter and delayed for
Q1, 2021. Consistent with the previous results
sections, the strength of the results begin to
dissipate in Q2 2021, as the most of the economies
attempted to reopen.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we evaluate how the aggressiveness
of each state’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic
affected their respective economies from Q2, 2020
through Q2, 2021. Here, we find that the state’s
aggression ranking significantly increases the
unemployment rate changes over the entire analyzed
period. Similar unemployment results occur across
the board regarding the immediate and delayed
impact of each state’s aggression rating. Government
mandates on business closures, masking policies, etc.
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clearly had the most significant impact in regards
to the unemployment levels of those respective
industries. These findings confirm our previous
argument, that government policies do have a strong
impact on the unemployment level of all industries.
Specifically, this goes into further detail on Ezcurra
and Rios’ (2019) argument that the government
is the most important institution in regards to
economic recovery.
For year-over-year GDP growth, we found that the
state’s aggression ranking has a significantly negative
impact (both immediate and delayed) on yearover-year GDP growth. Our results also indicate
that a higher percentage of white population led
to significantly less negative GDP growth. This
suggests that communities with more white people
were essentially less affected over the course of the
crisis. This helps to further explain the effects and
nature of a transboundary crisis. This coincides

Economic Implications of State-Wide Covid-19 Response Aggressiveness

17

with the findings of Matheson and Baade (2004),
that the crisis had a more severe impact on minority
racial communities. Despite its nature, this crisis still
managed to have disproportionate impact on certain
groups. It is worth further investigation into which
specific racial groups might have been more/less
affected how far these GDP drops extend.
For taxable sales growth, we again find that the
response aggression played a significantly negative
role in taxable sales growth for a number of the
analyzed industries. For nearly half of the 27
analyzed industries, state aggressiveness posted a
significantly negative impact on taxable sales growth
into Q1, 2021. In this section, we can see that not all
industries were affected the same: Some industries
did not feel much of an impact, while others felt the
impact well into 2021.
This study attempts to quantify the impact of the
overall state governmental COVID-19 response
on each respective economy from Q2 2020 to
Q2 2021. These findings can, perhaps, serve as a
gauge for how future crisis policies might affect the
overall health of each respective economy it has
influence over. Government decision-makers and
policy-makers need to carefully weigh the negative
economic consequences when considering
health mandates.

References
Baade, R. A., Baumann, R., & Matheson, V. (2007).
	Estimating the economic impact of natural
and social disasters, with an application to
Hurricane Katrina. Urban Studies, 44(11),
2061–2076.
Bean, J. J. (2001). “Burn, baby, burn”: Small business
	in the urban riots of the 1960s: Errata.
Independent Review, 5(3), 472. https://www.
independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_05_2_bean.pdf
Boin, A. (2009), The new world of crises and crisis
	management: Implications for policymaking
and research. Review of Policy Research,
26(4), 367-377. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1541-1338.2009.00389.x

JoVSA • Volume 6, Issue 2 • Fall 2022

One of the main weaknesses is the span of time over
which our study takes place. Crises might take place
within a short window of time, but their effects span
years after their initial start (Boin; 2009; Collins &
Margo, 2007; Pelling et al., 2002). With our study
analyzing data year over year from 2019 to Q2
2021, we might not be able to capture the full postcrisis recovery. Future research in later years can
build off of the absence of data that we do not have
access to at this moment. Economic researchers,
like McCann (2021, April 6), have continued to
track each state’s aggression rating into 2021; this
data can continue to be applied in the same manner
as this study to measure this economic impact of
COVID-19 over extended periods of time.
Another weakness of this paper is that we only
analyze the negative economic consequences of
governmental response aggression and do not factor
in the health benefits received and potential lives
saved from these actions. Another future direction
to add onto the crisis literature could be to combine
the overall economic effect with the overall public
health effect of the pandemic. In turn, these two
frameworks could produce a net benefit/harm of
the pandemic for each state based on the economic
benefits/harms and public health benefits/harms of
each respective response aggression.
Boschma, R. (2015). Towards an evolutionary
	perspective on regional resilience. Regional
Studies, 49(5), 733-751. https://doi.org/10.10
80/00343404.2014.959481
Bristow, G., & Healy, A. (2014). Building resilient
	regions: Complex adaptive systems and the
role of policy intervention. Raumforschung
und Raumordnung. Spatial Research
and Planning, 72(2), 93-102. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s13147-014-0280-0
Collins, W. J., & Margo, R. A. (2007). The economic
	aftermath of the 1960s riots in American
cities: Evidence from property values. Journal
of Economic History, 67(4), 849–883. https://
doi.org/10.1017/S0022050707000423

Economic Implications of State-Wide Covid-19 Response Aggressiveness

18

Di Pietro, F., Lecca, P., & Salotti, S. (2021). Regional
	economic resilience in the European Union:
A numerical general equilibrium analysis.
Spatial Economic Analysis, 16(3), 287-312.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17421772.2020
.1846768
Ezcurra, R., & Rios, V. (2019). Quality of
	government and regional resilience in the
European Union. Evidence from the great
recession. Papers in Regional Science,
98(3), 1267– 1290. https://doi.org/10.1111/
pirs.12417
Fratesi, U., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2016). The crisis
	and regional employment in Europe: what
role for sheltered economies?. Cambridge
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society,
9(1), 33-57. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/
rsv032
Garrett, T. A. (2007, November). Economic effects
	of the 1918 influenza pandemic: Implications
for a modern-day pandemic. Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://www.
stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/communitydevelopment/research-reports/pandemic_flu_
report.pdf
Giannakis, E., & Bruggeman, A. (2017).
	Determinants of regional resilience to
economic crisis: a European perspective.
European Planning Studies, 25(8), 1394–
1415. https://doi.org/10.1080/09654313.201
7.1319464
Martin, R. (2012). Regional economic resilience,
	hysteresis and recessionary shocks. Journal of
economic geography, 12(1), 1-32.
Martin, R., & Sunley, P. (2015). On the notion
	of regional economic resilience:
Conceptualization and explanation. Journal
of Economic Geography, 15(1), 1–42.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbu015

JoVSA • Volume 6, Issue 2 • Fall 2022

Matheson, V. A., & Baade, R. A. (2004). Race and
	riots: A note on the economic impact of the
Rodney King riots. Urban Studies, 41(13),
2691-2696. https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098
042000294628
McCann, A. (2021, April 6). States with the
	fewest coronavirus restrictions. Wallethub.
https://wallethub.com/edu/states-coronavirusrestrictions/73818
Merriam-Webster. (2016). Resilience definition &
	meaning. Merriam-Webster. https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resilience
National Science Foundation. (n.d.). Bachelor’s
	degree holders among individuals 25–44 years
old. Science & Engineering State Indicators.
https://ncses.nsf.gov/indicators/states/
indicator/bachelors-degree-holders-per-25-44year-olds
OECD. (n.d.). Working age population. OECD
	iLibrary. doi: 10.1787/d339918b-en
Paulson Gjerde, K. A., Prescott, P. A., & Rice, J. L.
	(2019). The impact of state fiscal policy on
states’ resilience entering the great recession.
Journal of Regional Analysis & Policy, 49(1),
13–30.
Pelling, M., Özerdem, A., & Barakat, S. (2002).
	The macro-economic impact of
disasters. Progress in Development
Studies, 2(4), 283-305. https://doi.
org/10.1191/1464993402ps042ra
Ringwood, L., Watson, P., & Lewin, P. (2019). A
	quantitative method for measuring regional
economic resilience to the great recession.
Growth & Change, 50(1), 381–402. https://
doi.org/10.1111/grow.12265
Smith, S., & McCarty, C. (1996). Demographic
	effects of natural disasters: A case study of
Hurricane Andrew. Demography, 33(2), 265275. https://doi.org/10.2307/2061876

Economic Implications of State-Wide Covid-19 Response Aggressiveness

19

Sutherland, D., & Hoeller, P. (2013). Growth	promoting policies and macroeconomic
stability (OECD Economics Department
Working Paper No. 1091). http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2362204
United States Census Bureau. (2021, April 26).
	
Historical population density data (19102020). https://www.census.gov/data/tables/
time-series/dec/density-data-text.html
United States Census Bureau. (2021, August 12).
	
Racial and ethnic diversity in the United
States: 2010 census and 2020 census. https://
www.census.gov/library/visualizations/
interactive/racial-and-ethnic-diversity-in-theunited-states-2010-and-2020-census.html
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). (n.d.).
	
Bureau of Economic Analysis. https://www.
bea.gov/
Verschuur, J., Koks, E. E., & Hall, J. W. (2021).
	Global economic impacts of COVID-19
lockdown measures stand out in highfrequency shipping data. PloS one, 16(4),
e0248818. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0248818

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Bryan Foltice is an Associate Professor of Finance at
Butler University, in Indianapolis, IN. He primarily
teaches in the areas of international finance,
investments, and behavioral finance. Dr. Foltice’s
true passion is assisting people with all aspects
of their personal finances. His academic research
interests behavioral finance include: Retirement
savings, retirement plan designs, and financial
decision-making. Dr. Foltice received his doctorate in
finance at the University of Muenster, in Muenster,
Germany, where he received magna cum laude
honors. He has prior work experience at Fidelity
Investments and in investment banking at Deutsche
Bank. Dr. Foltice also played professional basketball
in Germany for three seasons.
Michael Parker is a recent Marketing graduate of
Butler University (2022) and currently works as an
Account Executive at Direct Connect Logistics in
Indianapolis, Indiana. Mr. Parker received magna
cum laude honors and graduated Butler University
with high departmental distinction. He played on
Butler’s Men’s Basketball team and was named on
the Big-East All-Academic basketball team three
times.

World Population Review. (n.d.). Income inequality
	by state 2022. https://worldpopulationreview.
com/state-rankings/income-inequality-by-state
Ženka, J., Slach, O., & Pavlík, A. (2019). Economic
	resilience of metropolitan, old industrial, and
rural regions in two subsequent recessionary
shocks. European Planning Studies, 27(11),
2288-2311. https://doi.org/10.1080/0965431
3.2019.1638346
Zhang, Z., Cui, P., Hao, J., Li, N., Zeng, Z.,
	Liu, Y., Zou, Q., Huang, C., & Wu, S.
(2021). Analysis of the impact of dynamic
economic resilience on post-disaster
recovery “secondary shock” and sustainable
improvement of system performance.
Safety Science, 144, 105443. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ssci.2021.105443

JoVSA • Volume 6, Issue 2 • Fall 2022

Economic Implications of State-Wide Covid-19 Response Aggressiveness 20

